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Abstract
This paper presents a legal-economic analysis of the Appellate Body’s decision that the WTO’s AntiDumping Agreement (ADA) precludes countries from taking into account government-created price
distortions of major inputs when calculating anti-dumping duties, made in EU-Biodiesel (Argentina).
In this case, the EU made adjustments to the price of biodiesel’s principal input – soybeans – in
determining the cost of production of biodiesel in Argentina. The adjustment was made based on the
uncontested finding that the price of soybeans in Argentina was distorted by the existence of an export
tax scheme that resulted in artificially low soybean prices. The Appellate Body found that the EU was
not permitted to take tax policy-induced price distortions into account in calculating dumping margins.
We analyze the economic rationale for Argentina’s export tax system, distortions in biodiesel markets
in Argentina and the EU, and the remaining trade policy options for addressing distorted international
prices. We also assess whether existing subsidies disciplines would be more effective in addressing
this problem and conclude that they would not.

Keywords
WTO, anti-dumping, export tax, cost adjustment, government distortion, subsidy
JEL Classification: F13, F53.

I. Introduction
The dispute between the EU and Argentina over the application of European antidumping duties on
biodiesel imported from Argentina raises big questions about the functioning of the WTO Agreements
when confronted with problems that are not explicitly addressed in the treaty text or that may fall in
the cracks between the WTO’s Agreement on Anti-dumping (ADA) and its Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures (SCM). In this case, an economic policy by one country (Argentina) had
a trade-distorting effect that was similar to a production subsidy, but it was not clear what legal
provisions of the WTO were most appropriate for addressing and offsetting the underlying price
distortion. Anti-competitive practices by private firms that lead to distorted international prices are
typically addressed by the imposition of anti-dumping duties, consistent with the ADA. In contrast,
government intervention that confers financial benefits on exporting firms and distorts international
prices is typically addressed through the application of countervailing duties under the SCM
Agreement. A narrow legal interpretation of either the ADA or the SCM could leave an importing
country with no options to address low-priced imports that harm domestic producers when those low
prices are caused by distortions in markets for inputs.
The meta-problem highlighted by this case is the interaction of market economies with non-market
economies. A distortion affecting prices in one sector of the economy that is caused by a government
policy can pass-through into the prices of internationally traded goods. Thus, a case could be made for
some kind of trade remedy in the importing country. However, the letter of the WTO law is not wellsuited to analyzing distortions that are one or two degrees removed from the internationally traded
good. Assessing the impact of a market intervention that is one or two degrees away from the
internationally trade good requires the use of econometrics. Methodologies for assessing dumping
margins have been the focal point of a number of trade remedy disputes.1 The WTO agreement will
continue to face challenges arising from not only the “Non-Market Economy” status of some WTO
members, but also with issues that could arise for vertically integrated global firms and for firms in
vertically-structured industries.
Interestingly, the addendum to the AB Report summarizing the third party submissions in this case
demonstrates that support for Argentina compared to the EU appears to follow a strict party line in
which the more market-based economies with lower levels of government intervention supported the
EU’s position (e.g. the US) whereas the economies characterized by extensive government
involvement in markets favored Argentina’s arguments (e.g. Saudi Arabia and China).
Our analysis focuses on what we see as the most important aspect of the dispute and the AB’s
ruling – the use of alternative data to construct production costs for an exporter.2
This dispute follows a long line of WTO challenges to anti-dumping measures where the heart of
the challenge relates to adjustments to prices made by the investigating authorities (here, the European
Commission) to data presented to it by exporting producers.3 In this case, the EU imposed antidumping duties on imports of biodiesel fuel exported from Argentina, where soybeans were the
1

2

3

See Horn and Mavroidis (2006), Bown and Sykes (2008), Prusa and Vermulst (2009) and Crowley and Howse (2010) for
a discussion of challenges to dumping methodologies in previous WTO disputes.
While the AB report included findings with respect to the WTO constituency of certain provisions of the EU’s Basic
Antidumping regulation, the amount of dumping duties imposed and the EU’s reliance on certain capacity data as part of
its injury findings, with the exception of Table 1, we leave those issues aside.
Other legal-economic assessment of related disputes in this series include BOWN, C., & SYKES, A. (2008). The Zeroing
Issue: A critical analysis of Softwood V. World Trade Review, 7(1), 121-142. doi:10.1017/S1474745607003564; Horn,
H., & Mavroidis, P. (2006). European Community – Antidumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings
from
Brazil
(WT/DS219/AB/R:
DSR
2003:VI,
2613). World
Trade
Review, 5(S1),
87-129.
doi:10.1017/S1474745606001418.
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primary input material used by Argentine biodiesel producers. In constructing a home (i.e. Argentine)
market price for Argentine biodiesel, the Commission chose to adjust the price of soybeans in order to
compensate for the distortion in soybean prices caused by an export tax scheme imposed on soybeans,
soybean oil and biodiesel by the Argentine government. There was no dispute that Argentina used this
tax to discourage exports of soybeans and to keep the price of soybeans low; the data on record shows
Argentine soybean prices were about 35 percent below international soybean prices.4 A lower price for
soybeans implies a lower margin of dumping than would have been the case if Argentine producers
had paid the international or a non-distorted price for soybeans.
This case thus raises the question of whether the WTO’s Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA) permits
countries to take government-created distortions to the price of major inputs into account when
calculating the home-market price of allegedly dumped goods. The answer from the Appellate Body is
no and that answer likely has significant implications not only for this case but for all cases in which
investigating authorities are faced with distorted home market prices, particularly in non-market
economies such as China and Vietnam.
In this article, we begin with an analysis of the legal and economic merits of the case presented to
the AB for resolution. We then proceed to a counterfactual discussion of whether the economic
situation involving Argentine biodiesel should have proceeded in the EU as an anti-subsidy case.
Interestingly, an anti-subsidy case was filed almost simultaneously with the antidumping case.
However, the anti-subsidy case was withdrawn by the European domestic producers and terminated by
the Commission shortly after the Commission issued its final determination to impose antidumping
duties. In discussing the subsidy issues at play in this case, we point out an important gap in the
current WTO rules governing the interaction of market and non-market economies.

II. Background of the EU Antidumping Measure on Biodiesel
In August 2012, the European Biodiesel Board (EBB), representing biodiesel producers in Europe,
filed a complaint contending that imports of biodiesel from Argentina and Indonesia were being sold
in Europe for less than they sold for at home and that these low-priced imports were injuring European
biodiesel producers. In most dumping cases, the amount of dumping is determined by comparing the
price at which the good is sold in its home market (Normal Value) with the price at which it is sold in
the importing country. 5 However, the ADA permits Investigating Authorities (IAs) to depart from
using home market sales prices: 1) when there are no home market sales of the product “in the
ordinary course of trade,” or 2) when a particular market situation or a low volume of sales does not
permit a proper comparison. (ADA Art. 2.2) Here, the EBB contended (and the Commission found)
that the Argentine involvement in regulating all aspects of biodiesel production was so extensive that
domestic prices for sales of biodiesel could not be used to determine the Normal Value (i.e., they were
no sales “in the ordinary course of trade”).6 Because all dumping determinations involve a comparison

4

5

The Argentines challenged European assumptions about what the international, world-market price would have been in
the absence of the Argentine export tax system. We take this up in Sections III and VI below.
Dumping is considered to have occurred whenever thde Export Price is below the Normal Value (or home-market price)
of a good. For example, if biodiesel sold for $10 per gallon in Argentina but sold for $7 per gallon in Europe, dumping in
the amount of $3 per gallon would be found. Anti-dumping duties equal to the amount of dumping can be imposed if an
Investigating Authority also determines that the dumped imports caused material injury to the domestic producers of the
good. A low (potentially dumped) price confers an economic benefit to consumers in Europe, but harms EU biodiesel
producers forced to compete with a significant volume of low-priced imports. The Commission’s (and the WTO ADA's)
viewpoint that low prices are a problem assumes that EU producers’ well-being is more important than that of EU
consumers. This is a normative question that we set aside for the moment.

6

The EU asserted and no party contested that sales in Argentina were not “in the ordinary course of trade.” As such,
neither the Panel nor the Appellate Body attempted to further define “ordinary course of trade,” nor were the other bases
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between Normal Value and the Export Price of a good, the Commission was forced to look to
alternatives to the sales prices in Argentina to determine a Normal Value. The ADA provides for two
basic alternatives to the use of home market sales prices: 1) prices for sales in a third country market
or 2) the cost of production (COP) plus selling, general and administrative expenses plus a reasonable
profit. The Commission opted to use the COP alternative to construct a Normal Value.
To conduct its COP analysis, the Commission was required to determine the price of the key inputs
used in Argentina to make biodiesel. Chief among these was soybeans and soybean oil. In the
preliminary phase of its investigation, the Commission stated that it did not have sufficient
information to address the EBB’s contention that the price of soybeans and soybean oil was itself too
distorted to be used in determining the cost of production for biodiesel but that it would take up the
issue in the final, definitive stage of the investigation. Therefore, for its provisional decision, the
Commission used the cost of soybeans and soybean oil as reflected in the books and records of the
selected Argentine producers (i.e., the distorted input price) and on that basis, found that biodiesel
from Argentina had been dumped in Europe at margins of dumping ranging from 6.8% to 10.6%.
In the final phase of its investigation, the Commission examined the domestic prices of soybeans
and soybean oil and found: 1) that Argentina’s export tax system resulted in prices for soybeans that
were considerably below the international price, and 2) that the reference price used by the Argentine
government to calculate the export tax on soybeans reflected the international price of soybeans. As a
result, the Commission decided to use the Argentine reference price (minus certain transport “fobbing”
costs) in lieu of the actual prices paid by Argentine producers when determining the cost of the raw
materials used to produce biodiesel. The Commission reasoned that this reference price is what
“would have been the price paid . . . in the absence of the export tax system.”7 As a result of using
these reference prices, the Commission found much higher margins of dumping than in the
preliminary phase, with dumping margins ranging from 41.9% to 49.2%.8
How and why were the home market prices of Argentine biodiesel distorted? The basic economics
suggest that the price of Argentine biodiesel was low relative to what it would have been in the
absence of the export taxes on soybeans and soybean products. Biodiesel’s primary input is soybeans
(75-80% of costs) which were very cheap in Argentina because the Argentine government applied a
high export tax on raw soybeans and a lower export tax on biodiesel, a higher-value added commodity.
This Argentine policy presumably was designed to have two effects; first, by placing a higher tax on
the raw commodity than on a more processed good, the Argentine government was attempting to raise
the value-added component of Argentina’s exports and aid the economy in moving up the value chain
in its exports; second, by putting downward pressure on the domestic price of the primary input into
biodiesel, raw soybeans, the government policy was a directed financial transfer to biodiesel producers
at the expense of soybean farmers. In other words, the government offered biodiesel producers a de
facto production subsidy (a financial benefit that was specific to the industry), but the cost of this
subsidy program was borne by sellers of soybeans who received low, tax-distorted prices. By
structuring the intervention as an export tax on an input rather than a direct production subsidy (a
subsidy to purchasing the input), the cost of the program appeared on the government balance sheet as
tax revenue (rather than an expenditure), yet still conferred benefits that were clearly specific to a
single industry – biodiesel production.9
(Contd.)
for departing from the use of Normal Value (“particular market situation” or “low volume of sales”) addressed in this
dispute.
7
8

9

AB Report, para. 5.8, referring to Panel Report, para. 7.257 and Definitive Disclosure (Panel Exhibit ARG-35) para. 32.
Because the EU applies a lesser duty rule and the Commission found that the injury margins were at rates ranging from
22% to 25.7%, those lesser rates were the rates definitively applied by the EU rather than the 41.9% to 49.2% dumping
margins.
The question of who bore the burden of (i.e. paid) the export tax on soybeans depends on the conditions of competition in
the international market for soybeans, that is, the elasticities of export supply and import demand. We take this up further
in section VI.

European University Institute
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III. Does the Anti-Dumping Agreement Permit the Use of Alternatives to Actual Costs?
The heart of the dispute between the EU and Argentina rests on the disparate views of what data
investigating authorities (IAs) conducting anti-dumping investigations are required to use when
determining the Normal Value of allegedly dumped goods. Argentina’s basic contention is that ADA
requires IAs to use the actual prices paid for goods in the country of origin, no matter how distorted or
far from “reality” such prices might be. If the prices are reflected in actual books and records of
companies as what they actually paid for inputs, then the IA must rely on them. The EU, on the other
hand, claims that there is an overarching standard of reasonableness that permits IAs to look elsewhere
when the actual prices are not reasonable and that IAs are not required to blindly follow actual prices
paid if those prices bear no rational relationship to a “real” price due to government interventions that
distort the actual prices.10
As such, the dispute centers on the interpretation of two provisions found in ADA Article 2:
1) Article 2.2, which permits IAs to abandon home market sales prices when, among others, there
are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of trade and to look to alternatives for
determining Normal Value, including the “cost of production in the country of origin plus a reasonable
amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits,” which are often lumped together
as simply the Cost of Production (COP). There was no dispute in this case over the EU decision not to
use home market sales prices or to the decision to opt for a COP analysis. Rather the dispute centered
on the COP assumptions and methodology used by the EU.
The Argentines never contested that their tax policy reduced the domestic price of soybeans. In
fact, their position during the EU’s original investigation was two-fold: first, the export tax system was
permitted under WTO rules and, second, the resulting low input prices were most appropriately seen
as “the natural competitive advantage of the Argentine producers.”11 In their view, the tax system
conferred on Argentine producers a fair competitive advantage that created real welfare gains for the
Argentine firms’ European customers. Throughout the EU’s original antidumping investigation and
the WTO dispute, Argentina argued that the Commission was incorrectly interpreting the ADA and
was wrong to use international soybean prices in constructing the cost of domestic biodiesel
producers.
The legal issue under Article 2.2 was whether the EU, in using a reference price established by the
Argentine government based on international prices, had correctly found the COP in Argentina, the
country of origin. The EU contended that the soybean prices it used reflected the soybean costs that
the producers of biodiesel would pay in Argentina absent the distortion caused by the Argentine export
tax system. As such, the EU argued that these prices were costs “in the country of origin” within the
meaning of ADA Article 2.2.
Argentina, on the other hand, submitted that the phrase in Article 2.2 “cost of production in the
country of origin” refers only to expenses incurred in the production of the product at issue in the
country of origin, which can only be determined by using information and evidence from the country
of origin—and not through the use of international prices or outside benchmarks.
In its analysis, the Appellate Body first rejected the basic notion that outside information or
evidence can never be used to determine COP inside the country of origin. It then established the
following test: “when relying on any out-of-country information to determine the cost of production in

10

11

4

The EU concluded that “the domestic prices of the main raw material used by biodiesel producers in Argentina were . . .
lower than the international prices due to the distortion created by the Argentine export tax system and, consequently, the
costs of the main raw material were not reasonably reflected in the records kept by the Argentinean producers.” Panel
Report, para. 7.181.
Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1194/2013 in Official Journal of the European Union L 315/6(41) of 26
November 2013.
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the country of origin under Article 2.2, an investigating authority has to ensure that such information is
used to arrive at the ‘cost of production in the country of origin’, and this may require the
investigating authority to adapt that information.” (para. 6.82, emphasis added). As such, the Appellate
Body is stating that the only permitted analysis is one that ends with the cost of production in the
country of origin. As such, it appears that the right to use outside information may have been given
with one hand, while, as a practical matter, been taken away with the other, as it is likely to be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for an IA to meet the Appellate Body’s test. Any IA wishing to
rely on outside information bears the burden of showing that any outside information used nonetheless
results in a determination of prices inside the country of origin. How is an IA supposed to make such a
showing? It is precisely because prices inside a country are unavailable or not usable or distorted that
the IA would have turned to outside benchmarks in the first place. Moreover, it is not clear what the
Appellate Body means by “arrives at.” If it means that the outside information must produce a cost
that is equal to the inside country price, then there would be no reason to resort to outside information
or prices if the result must be the same. If the prices or costs inside the country of origin are distorted,
it is not clear why the IA should be required to “arrive at” that same distorted price.
Indeed, the Appellate Body’s reasoning with respect to Article 2.2 appears to be the ultimate
Catch-22. The Appellate Body notes that the EU opted to use a surrogate price for soybeans precisely
because the surrogate price did not represent the cost for soybeans in Argentina (which the EU had
found to be distorted due to the export tax scheme) but then found that the EU violated Article 2.2
because the surrogate used did not represent the cost of soybeans in Argentina. It is hard to imagine
how any IA would ever be able to prove that the domestic prices cannot be used due to distortions or
unavailability and at the same time find a surrogate price that it can prove represents those same
domestic prices (presumably as they would have been absent distortions).
Two distinct and important issues were confounded by the AB’s Catch-22 ruling. First, what is
dumping? In other words, are exporters dumping if they set prices to maximize profits given a locally
available input price? Or, if an input price is favorably distorted by a government policy, does this
automatically imply dumping by a profit-maximizing firm? Second, what guidance does the treaty
provide on how an Investigating Authority determines the cost of production of an exported good?
Does it provide any guidance on how to determine the “true” price of an input in the presence of a
distortive tax or subsidy? In other words, is this entire line of analysis conducted by the EU permitted
under Article 2.2?
The answer to the first question requires an almost philosophical response; most economists object
to the legal definition of dumping provided by Article 2.2 and instead interpret “dumping” to refer to
an anticompetitive behavior by a firm that is intended to eliminate competitors or increase a firm’s
market power so that the firm can raise prices in the future. Economists condemn anti-competitive
practices but generally approve of pricing strategies, such as temporarily pricing below cost, that are
prohibited by Article 2.2. Viewed in this light, the prices of Argentine biodiesel producers were the
outcome of normal profit-maximizing behavior and did not constitute dumping in the anticompetitive
behavior sense. However, if an economic analysis were premised on the Article 2.2 definition of
dumping as pricing below cost, the question of how to construct cost appropriately becomes relevant.
The Argentine view was that the price of soybeans in Argentina, inclusive of the effect of any taxes,
was the relevant price for determining costs. From an accounting perspective, the prevailing price of
the input inclusive of taxes and subsidies would be the correct price for determining the firm’s profits.
Logically, that same input price should be used for other analyses.
However, the problem that arises with using the prevailing price of the primary input in the country
of origin to construct costs is that it ignores the trade-distorting impact of the actions of the Argentine
government. This leads to the second question, how should an Investigating Authority determine the
price of an input for constructing costs and estimating dumping margins? The convoluted language of
the AB seems to rule out using information other than local information precisely when local market
information is unavailable. Into this information vacuum, the remaining option the AB inadvertently
European University Institute
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left on the table is an econometric approach to estimating the input price in the country of origin. An
econometric approach would use Argentine data to estimate the export supply elasticity facing
Argentina together with information on the local tax program to estimate the local input price in the
absence of the tax program. Interestingly, the procedure the Commission followed, which ignored
econometrics and used the international market price as the reference price for soybeans, would have
arrived at the same conclusion as an econometric analysis if the global export supply of soybeans were
perfectly elastic. If Argentina faced an almost perfectly elastic export supply curve, the domestic price
of soybeans in the absence of Argentina’s export tax policy would have been equal to the international
price.12
2) Article 2.2.1.1, which explains how the COP is to be determined, specifically states that “cost
shall normally be calculated on the basis of records kept by the exporter or producer . . . provided that
such records are in accordance with the generally accepted accounting principles of the exporting
country and reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the product under
consideration.” (ADA Art. 2.2.1.1).
The dispute here centered on the second condition for using the books and records of the exporter
or producer—that they reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the
product under consideration. The EU contended that this phrase permits an IA to examine the
“reasonableness” of the costs themselves, noting that the costs referred to in Art. 2.2.1.1 “must
themselves be ‘reasonable’ if the records are to reasonably reflect them.” (para. 6.35). Argentina, for
its part, contended that the IA is only permitted to examine the reliability and accuracy of the costs
reported in the records to ensure that they reflect the actual costs paid by the producer or exporter. For
Argentina, Article 2.2.1.1 does not allow an IA to assess whether the recorded costs meet some
general standard of “reasonableness” through a comparison with hypothetical costs that might prevail
in a hypothetical market, free from government regulation or distortion.
The Appellate Body largely agreed with the panel and with Argentina, finding that the phrase
“reasonably reflect the costs” means “whether the records kept by the exporter or producer suitably
and sufficiently correspond to or reproduce those costs incurred by the investigated exporter or
producer that have a genuine relationship with the production and sale of the specific product under
consideration.” (para.6.26) For the panel and the Appellate Body, the “reasonably reflect” phrase was
intended to ensure that the costs were the “actual” cost incurred for the production of the precise
product at issue. So long as the books and records reflect the amount actually paid –no matter how
ridiculous that amount might be—that amount must be used. In reaching this conclusion, the Appellate
Body expressly rejected the EU’s attempt to read into the phrase “reasonably reflect the costs” the
notion of costs pertaining to the production and sale of biodiesel in “normal circumstances” yet
accepted reading in the notion of “actual” costs so long as they were reflected in books and records,
even though the word “actual” does not appear in Article 2.2.1.1.
There was no dispute that the prices for soybeans in Argentina were distorted, nor any dispute that
the prices did not reflect the world-wide price for a commodity such as soybeans, yet no room found
in the ADA not to use them anyway. The Appellate Body interpreted the phrase “reasonably reflect
the costs” narrowly, focusing largely on whether the costs in a given producer’s books and records
accurately reflect the cost of producing the particular like product at issue, since many producers may
12

The Argentines presented an argument against this claim; “CARBIO complained that the Commission did not take into
account the fact that in the absence of the DET [export tax] in Argentina, the CBOT [international] prices of soya beans
would have been much lower.” See Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1194/2013 in Official Journal of the
European Union L 315/6(41) of 26 November 2013. There is likely some truth to this claim. Argentina’s share of the
global market for soybeans, soybean meal and soybean oil is substantial and growing. In 2001, Argentina’s share of the
world market for soybeans and soybean meal was 24% (See Schnepf, Dohlman, and Bolling; 2001, p. 2). By 2016, the
US Department of Agriculture was forecasting that Argentina would capture half of the world market for soybean meal
and oil by 2026 (See Lee, Tran, Jansen and Ash; 2016). Together, these facts suggest that Argentina, as a major supplier,
was able to exert some market power over international prices through its export tax policy.

6

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers

Slamming the door on trade policy discretion? The WTO Appellate Body’s ruling in EU—Biodiesel (Argentina)

be producing a variety of products in the same facility. As such, for the Appellate Body, the phrase
“reasonably reflect the costs” was about whether a proper allocation of costs had been made; the
phrase was not read to encompass a broader notion that books and records can accurately record cost
figures that are nonetheless “unreasonable” because they are distorted.

IV. Has the Appellate Body Left Any Room to Address Distorted Prices in AntiDumping Cases?
As a result of the Appellate Body’s dual findings that use of the alternative COP methodology under
Article 2.2 for determining Normal Value must: 1) limit the use of outside benchmarks to those which
“arrive at” the costs inside the country of origin and 2) use the actual costs in the books and records of
the exporting producer so long as they reflect proper cost allocations, no matter how disconnected they
may be from international or “real” market prices, the Appellate Body appears to have left little room
in the ADA to address distorted prices or costs in non-market or other economies in which government
policies have affected the prices of input material used to produce internationally-traded goods.
This approach to a strict reading of cost comparisons in the ADA stands in fairly stark contrast to
the interpretations made with respect to subsidies under the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM). There, for example, a subsidy is deemed to exist if the government
purchases goods from a domestic producer at a value that is even slightly above the market price for
that good or provides goods or services to company for a price below market value. And outside
benchmarks are often used to determine the market prices for goods or services.
Indeed, the jurisprudence on subsidies leaves little doubt that the existence of a financial
contribution and a benefit –and hence a subsidy—must be done based on a comparison between a
market price and the amount of the government contribution. The Panel in Canada — Aircraft found
that “the only logical basis” for determining whether the financial contribution places the recipient in a
more advantageous position than it otherwise would have been “is the market.”(para 9.112) According
to the Panel: “[A] financial contribution will only confer a ‘benefit’, i.e., an advantage, if it is provided
on terms that are more advantageous than those that would have been available to the recipient on the
market.”(para 9.112) Hence in the subsidies context, the existence of a market price and the
determination of that price is a central question for which evidence must be provided. It is not simply
assumed based on the books and records of any particular company involved.
With respect to the use of outside benchmarks, the contrast between the Appellate Body’s rejection
of the Argentine references prices for soybeans used to make biodiesel in the anti-dumping context
from the Appellate Body’s endorsement in United States – Definitive Anti-dumping and
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China (US-Anti-Dumping and Countervailing
Duties) of outside benchmarks for the price of hot-rolled steel is remarkable. In US-Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties, for hot-rolled steel, the Appellate Body stated: “we are of the view that an
investigating authority may reject in-country private prices if it reaches the conclusion that these are
too distorted due to the predominant participation of the government as a supplier in the market . . . It
is, therefore, price distortion that would allow an investigating authority to reject in-country private
prices, not the fact that the government is the predominant supplier per se. (para. 446). Yet in the
context of calculating the COP for biodiesel, the Appellate Body accepted the EU’s analysis that the
private prices were distorted due to government intervention through the export tax scheme, but
nonetheless severely restricted the EU’s ability to bring in outside benchmarks to correct for such
distortions.
While the Appellate Body’s narrow interpretation of the key phrases in Articles 2.2 and 2.2.1.1 of
the ADA appears to have shut the door on taking market distortions into account when determining
costs of production, there may be a few windows left open. First, by its terms, the AB report is limited
to an analysis of the second condition for using records of the exporter (that records “reasonably
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reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the product under consideration”) (fn. 120).
Therefore, the AB leaves open an interpretation of both the first condition for the use of exporter
records (i.e., that the records are “in accordance with the generally accepting accounting principles of
the country”), and more importantly, the opening phrase in Art 2.2.1.1, that costs shall normally be
calculated on the basis of the records . . .” As such, the AB has not ruled on whether distortions,
particularly in non-market economy countries where separating distorted from non-distorted prices
may be especially difficult, can rise to the level of creating an abnormal situation such that deviation
from the norm of relying on exporter records is entirely justified.
In addition, the EU’s deviation from use of Argentine sales prices was based entirely on its
unchallenged determination that there were no sales in the ordinary course of trade. As such, this case
does not address what may be the more difficult question of what is meant by “the particular market
situation” that would also justify using COP or third country prices in lieu of home market sales
prices.
Finally, because Argentina did not challenge the EU determination of a lack of sales in the ordinary
course of trade, the AB left open the question of the relationship between that lack of ordinary course
sales and distortions in the market. It is possible that in another case, substantial evidence could be
developed about why there were no sales that were considered to be in “the ordinary course,” just what
that “ordinary course” might be in a given market, and what distortions can be seen to arise from a
lack of sales in that “ordinary course” that would support the use of adjustments to costs under the
COP or would mean that exporter records reflect an abnormal situation justifying a departure from the
normal reliance on exporters records.
Why such a strict reading of the ADA with respect to the COP methodology? In essence, the AB’s
decision might be interpreted as strong guidance to re-direct the focus of antidumping policy back to
its original purpose – addressing anticompetitive practices by firms – and away from its growing use
as a catch-all to offset or correct every type of price distortion that can arise in a non-market or a
distorted economy. The deeper puzzle in this case is why the EBB and Commission pursued biodiesel
from Argentina as a dumping case rather than an anti-subsidy case when the evidence suggests that the
agent ultimately responsible for the low price of exported biodiesel was the Argentine government.
Perhaps in restricting discretion in COP methodologies for dumping cases, the AB was trying to force
countries to use anti-subsidy measures when price distortions arise from government action.
Alternatively, because an econometric analysis would allow an Investigating Authority to construct a
local input price using local information (rather than information from international or third markets),
the AB might be encouraging the use of more sophisticated econometric methodologies in trade
remedy investigations

V. Alternative approaches to addressing distortions of international prices
As mentioned previously, the big puzzle in this case is why the EBB and Commission pursued an
antidumping case rather than an anti-subsidy case. An anti-subsidy case was initiated by the
Commission in November 2012, approximately six weeks after the anti-dumping case was initiated.
However, while the dumping case quickly resulted in preliminary results, the anti-subsidy case
appears to have stagnated before it was ultimately terminated in November 2013, one month after the
Commission’s definitive dumping determination.
A. Legal Challenges Faced in Using Subsidies Disciplines
From a legal standpoint, any effort to turn to subsidies disciplines rather than antidumping
immediately runs into the narrowing windows through which subsidy cases must fit in light of recent
Appellate Body decisions making subsidies disciplines harder to use. A successful subsidies case
involves showing the existence of: 1) a financial contribution, 2) by a government (or public body), 3)
8
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which confers a benefit and 4) is specific. (SCM Article 1). Argentina’s export tax, despite the
significant price distortions it created, does not fit neatly into those four requirements, particularly
given that the export tax on soybeans resulted in only an indirect effect on biodiesel producers. First, it
is hard to characterize the export tax as a financial contribution, as it involves a government collection
of revenue from exporters of soybeans, soybean oil and biodiesel, not the provision of government
monies to any of those producers. Nor does the export tax result in the provision of a tax exemption
that might constitute “foregone revenue” and hence a financial contribution.
Second, to the extent that the export tax could be seen as a financial contribution that confers a
benefit, it does so by creating market pressures for low prices for soybeans, not a direct provision of
government support to biodiesel producers. While subsidies can be found where the government has
provided goods (here, soybeans) for less than adequate remuneration, the Argentine government never
owned the soybeans and never directly set the prices at which the soybeans would be sold to biodiesel
producers, making it hard to show that the government itself provided below-cost soybeans to the
biodiesel producers.
Similarly, a subsidy can be found if, rather than providing the financial contribution and conferring
the benefit itself, the government “directs and entrusts” a private body to provide the subsidy in its
stead. Here too such a showing would be difficult, as it is not clear that the soybean farmers are
standing in the shoes of the government, nor that they have been directed to sell soybeans to biodiesel
producers at low prices. Demonstrating such “entrustment and direction” may have been the EU’s best
option, but obtaining evidence that the Argentine government was acting to ensure that the soybean
farmers had no option but to sell low-priced soybeans specifically to biodiesel producers and that such
sales were being made by farmers in lieu of a normal government practice of selling soybeans would
have been a tall order.13
B. Economic Analysis of the Export Tax as a Subsidy
An economic analysis of this case should begin with a review of the international markets for biodiesel
and biodiesel inputs (soybeans and soybean oil) as well as a review of the structure of the markets for
both products in Europe, Argentina and other relevant locations. Two important observations are a
starting point: firstly, biodiesel consumption is heavily influenced by a myriad of government
environmental regulations. It is more expensive than petroleum biodiesel, but many countries require
that diesel sold to consumers have a minimum share of renewable biodiesel. This leads to different
demand in different regions as well as for different varieties of biodiesel. Second, the primary input
into many varieties of biodiesel is soybeans, a commodity that is traded on spot and futures markets.
Thus, the global market for soybeans fits the classic definition of a competitive market.
1. Biodiesel markets and government environmental regulation
The market for biodiesel is driven by government environmental regulation around the world. In
Argentina, the Commission found that the home market price of biodiesel could not be used as a
Normal Value because (a) all diesel sold to consumers was regulated to have a biodiesel share of at
least 7% and (b) the price of this mandated biodiesel purchase was set by the State according to
complex formula.14 In Europe, biodiesel consumption was subject to similar if not more complex
rules. For example, in addition to the requirement that biodiesel comprise a minimum share (7%) of
consumer diesel, some Member States of the EU had additional incentives in place to use biodiesel

13

14

See Crowley and Palmeter (2009) for a discussion of the difficulty of proving “directs and entrusts” claims in the Korean
DRAMs case.
Commission Regulation (EU) No 490/2013 of 27 May 2013, Section 1.1, paragraph (44).
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manufactured from recycled vegetable oils or animal fats.15 Moreover, “In some Member States, quota
systems are in place that give a particular production quota to companies in that Member State or in
other Member States across the Union.”16 In sum, it is difficult to present a baseline “market” price for
biodiesel anywhere in the world. While the EU threw out the regulated, government-set Argentine
price as not suitable for Normal Value, prices in Europe were also driven by government regulations
and interventions. 17 This implies that it would be sensible to assess dumping using cost data, rather
than by comparing output prices across markets subject to different distortions.
2. The market for soybeans and biodiesel inputs
Raw soybeans are a commodity whose price is determined by the forces of global supply and global
demand. Argentina is a major world producer of soybeans; in 2001, Argentina’s share of the world
market for soybeans and soybean meal was 24% (See Schnepf, Dohlman, and Bolling; 2001, p. 2).
According to the USDA, over 2002-2015, Argentina’s differential export tax system provided stronger
incentives for Argentine farmers to produce soybeans over wheat or corn. This led to increased
acreage for soybeans and made Argentina a dominant player in the global soybean market. (See Lee,
Tran, Jansen and Ash; 2016). Together, these facts suggest that Argentina, as a major supplier, was
able to exert some market power over international prices through its export tax policy.
To understand the full impact of the Argentine export tax on soybeans, we need to know the world
export supply elasticity. Broda, Limao and Weinstein (2008) present the export supply elasticity for
soybeans facing five countries – China, the Czech Republic, Oman, the Russian Federation and Saudi
Arabia - at the HS04 level (1201). The average elasticity over these countries is 140, but the range is
enormous, from a high of 446 (the Russian Federation) to a low of 0.4 (Saudi Arabia). Soderberry
(2015) shows that the use of different methodologies yields extremely different estimates of the export
supply elasticity facing the US; the traditional Feenstra/Broda and Weinstein methodology yields an
estimate consistent with a perfectly elastic export supply curve while Limited Information Maximum
Likelihood finds that the US faces a highly inelastic (0.08) export supply. This wide range of estimates
highlights how difficult it is to gage the conditions of market competition with standard econometric
methodologies. The Argentine position was essentially that Argentina faced a somewhat inelastic
world supply curve while the Europeans assumed a perfectly elastic world supply curve. The evidence
presented above tends to support the Argentine position, but is far from conclusive.
A perfectly elastic world supply curve for soybeans would imply full pass through of any
Argentine export tax to the domestic price. A 10% export tax would induce a 10% decline in the
domestic price in Argentina and no change in the price of soybeans in Europe. In contrast, a relatively
inelastic export supply curve combined with a relatively inelastic import demand curve for soybeans in
foreign markets would imply that the burden of any Argentine export tax would be split between
Argentine soybean producers and consumers of soybeans in foreign markets. That is, as a large
supplier of soybeans, Argentina likely had market power that not only reduced the domestic price of
soybeans for Argentine biodiesel producers, but also drove up the world market price of soybeans for
European biodiesel producers.
We can thus conclude that the Argentine export tax led to a large input price decline which
represented a beneficial cost shock for biodiesel producers. The questions this raises, from the
perspective of economics, are, firstly, was this beneficial cost shock passed through to the price of
15
16
17
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See Commission Regulation (EU) No 490/2013 of 27 May 2013, Section 3.7, paragraphs (143)-(145).
Commission Regulation (EU) No 490/2013 of 27 May 2013, Section 3.8, paragraphs (150).
The US market is also heavily influenced by government regulation: “According to the U.S. Department of Energy, there
are reportedly more than 300 state laws, regulations and “funding opportunities” related to biodiesel production and use.”
USITC, “Biodiesel from Argentina and Indonesia: Investigation Nos. 701-TA-571-572 and 731-TA-1347-1348,” p. I-19,
May 2017.
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exported biodiesel, secondly, if so, by how much, and thirdly, does this amount to unfair government
subsidization of biodiesel producers? A related question is: did the export tax drive up the cost of
soybeans and soybean oil in Europe, placing European biodiesel producers at a disadvantage relative
to their Argentine competitors?
We would expect that the Argentine pricing strategy in response to an input cost shock would
depend on the elasticity of demand in the output market.18 If demand were highly elastic, we would
expect the firm to pass through low input prices to a low output price and increase its market share.
This type of behavior would appear consistent with the Article 2.2 definition of dumping. However, if
demand were relatively inelastic, we would expect the firm to keep its output price high in order to
extract larger profits. Interestingly, over the investigation period of 2009-2012, the price of
Argentina’s exported biodiesel rose 54%. At the same time, its market share increased modestly from
7.6% to 10.8%. These facts suggest that the Argentine firms were likely absorbing the cost advantage
conferred by the Argentine export tax into a larger profit margin. That is, Argentine biodiesel
producers would have been able to undercut their European competitors substantially, yet they appear
to have exploited their market power to capture high profit margins. From an economics perspective,
the pricing strategy seems to be at odds with traditional definitions of dumping. Rather, the export tax
on soybeans conferred a financial benefit on biodiesel producers that was similar to a production
subsidy but had the added benefit of placing European competitors at a cost disadvantage by raising
the price of soybeans on world markets.19

VI. Conclusion
The true problem with the export tax on soybeans is that the policy falls into an ambiguous area of
legal interpretation in which firms’ pricing strategies don’t look like dumping and the government
intervention doesn’t quite fit the SCM’s definition of a subsidy. However, the policy clearly had a
harmful effect on import-competing biodiesel producers in Europe. In addition to providing a cost
advantage to Argentine producers, it seems probable that the export tax directly drove up the costs of
European producers, placing them at a competitive disadvantage.
The ultimate question for international economic relations is thus if firms in an importing economy
are suffering a competitive disadvantage because of a foreign government policy, how should this be
dealt with at the WTO? Are the WTO’s unfair trade rules capable of neutralizing the distortion on
world prices? If the existing rules are inadequate for this type of problem – a distortion in a vertically
integrated industry that benefits an exporter – then what new rules would it be appropriate for the
WTO to adopt?
The AB's decision – that the EU regulation violated the WTO rules because a private firm cannot
be found to have dumped when its only crime was to purchase inputs at the prevailing (but distorted)
prices in its domestic market – has some merit in following the letter of the law. However, the finding
18

19

Broda, Greenfield and Weinstein (2006) provide estimates of import demand elasticities for biodiesel in a number of
European countries. They place the estimate for HS 151 in Germany at 1.75, in the UK at 2.31 and in France at 7.66. For
HS 271, their estimates are 5.00, 1.96, and 33, for Germany, the UK and France, respectively.
To be precise, biodiesel production in Europe uses rapeseed rather than soybeans as its primary feedstock. However,
soybeans and rapeseed are closely substitutable commodities. This implies that an increase in the price of soybeans on
world markets places upward pressure on the price of rapeseed, placing EU biodiesel producers at a cost disadvantage.
According to the USDA: “World oilseed trade consists of many closely substitutable commodities, such as soybeans,
rapeseed, sunflowerseed, and cottonseed. …The volume and source of foreign imports depends on seasonal availability
and
relative
prices,
credit
and
delivery
terms,
local
preferences,
and
quality.”
(https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/soybeans-oil-crops/trade/) Similarly, a 2008 report from the European
Commission highlights the substitutability of rapeseed with imported oilseeds noting that because of increased biodiesel
production, “EU rapeseed is being diverted from the food market, to be replaced by imported oilseeds and oils.” (De
Santi, et. al., 2008).
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also greatly curtails the future discretion of importing countries in trying to develop trade policies to
address market distortions that are not transparently subsidies or do not confer a direct benefit on the
domestic producers of the product subject to an investigation. The case points to a short-coming of the
WTO that will likely become more important over time as trade between Western-style capitalist
economies and economies with other forms of resource allocation increases.
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TABLE I: Synopsis of Claims and Findings
Claim

Argentina

EU

Panel

AB

ADA 2.2.1.1

EU failed to calculate
costs on basis of records
kept by producers; EU is
required to use actual
costs incurred in
Argentina by Argentine
producers

Violation by failing to
calculate cost of
production on basis of
records kept by producers
and on basis of actual
costs to the producers

Violation = EU determination
that domestic prices lower than
international prices due to
export tax was not, in itself, a
sufficient basis for concluding
that producers’ records do not
reasonably reflect costs or for
rejecting producers’ books and
records

ADA 2.2

Failure to construct NV
on basis of actual costs
in Argentina; EU cannot
use outside prices to
determine costs in
Argentina

Violation by using “costs”
for inputs that was not
cost prevailing in
Argentina

ADA 2.4

Failure to make due
allowance for
differences affecting
price comparability

Costs in records kept by
producers were distorted
by export tax system and
did not “reasonably reflect
the costs associated with
the product . . . “ The EU
looked to Argentine
reference price
(international price)
instead.
Not required to use actual
costs when costs do not
reflect reality; requirement
would break general
standard of reasonableness;
EU used prices Argentine
producers would have paid
absent distortions
Panel correctly found that
EU made permitted
allowances for differences
affecting price
comparability

ADA 9.3

Imposing AD duties in
excess of margins of
dumping

ADA 3.1 and
3.5

EU’s own overcapacity
to produce biodiesel
caused the injury, not
Argentine imports and
EU improperly adjusted
its capacity data
Provision that
authorities shall reject
or adjust costs when
costs reflect prices that
are “abnormally or
artificially low”
Provision permitting
adjustment “on any
other reasonable basis,
including information
from representative
markets.”
Provision permitting
adjustments on any
other reasonable basis

Margin of dumping was
properly calculated using
the reference price for
soybean costs
EU’s non-attribution
analysis was not based on
or affected by revised
capacity utilization data.

Violation b/c AD margins
in excess of what should
have been if had used
actual costs
No violation

Violation = can use outside
information but must ensure it
“arrives at” or “yields” the COP
in the country of origin;
surrogate used by EU did not
represent actual cost of
soybeans paid by Argentine
biodiesel producers
Unnecessary to rule, although
disagreed with Panel’s finding of
a general proposition in EC –
Fasteners (China 21.5) that
differences arising from
methodology for NV cannot be
challenged under ADA 2.4.
Violation = duties imposed were
in excess of margin of dumping

2(5) not inconsistent;
replicates 2.2.1.1 +
procedures when records to
not reflect costs

No violation

No violation/no panel error b/c
EU law does not require use of
information from other markets
that does not reflect cost in
producer market

Provision permits but does
not require EU to use costs
from outside country of
origin; only applies after
determination that records
do not reflect costs
Argentina did not meet its
burden just by showing
provision could be applied
in WTO inconsistent way

No violation

No violation b/c EU can use
other information to construct
costs in manner consistent with
ADA

No violation

No violation

As such 2(5)
EU Basic
Regulation/
2.2.1.1.

As such 2(5)
EU Basic
Regulation/
2.2

As such 2(5)
EU Basic
Regulation
/Art XVI:4

European University Institute

No violation

No violation = EU calculations
not tainted by revised data; EU
conclusion on role of
overcapacity was proper.
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